Jefferson County

Jefferson County sits at a 0.041 gross rent-to-price ratio, which translates to a 2.69% cap rate on a standard underwrite. At a $433,181 purchase price and $1,493 median rent, the math closes badly: after a 20% down payment, a 6.85% mortgage generates $2,271 in monthly debt service, and adding $523 in estimated operating expenses against $1,493 in rent produces a negative $1,300 monthly cash flow and a cash-on-cash return of negative 15.66%. The appreciation score of 58 is the only number in the data set that reflects positively on Jefferson, but even that comes with context: year-over-year home price growth of just 0.84% is not a compelling appreciation thesis in absolute terms. The affordability index sits at 38, which signals that the buyer pool is constrained, a condition that can suppress both rent growth and resale liquidity. Nationally, Jefferson ranks in the 10th percentile out of 1,000 counties and 21st out of 36 Oregon counties, confirming this is a below-average market by most measurable dimensions.

Given those numbers, Jefferson does not suit a cash-flow buyer at current prices and rates. Negative $1,300 per month is not a rounding error; it is a structural deficit that requires either a heavily discounted acquisition, meaningful rent premium from a specific asset type, or a significant rate improvement to turn positive. An appreciation buyer targeting price gains gets a 0.84% trailing year-over-year figure, which at the current price level means roughly $3,600 in nominal appreciation annually against a $86,636 equity position. That return is thin and does not compensate for the carrying losses. The investor profile most likely to find Jefferson workable is a value-add operator who can buy below median, force appreciation through renovation, and reposition rents above the $1,493 median, using that spread to shrink the cash-flow gap while holding for a longer exit. Even then, the 38 affordability index and the small population base of 24,659 people limit the renter pool and exit buyer universe, which constrains how aggressively rents can be pushed before vacancy becomes the binding constraint.

On carry costs, the state-average effective property tax rate is 0.97%, which the Tax Foundation classifies as a normal rate, and county or township actual rates may differ from this estimate. At the current purchase price, that translates to $4,202 annually in property tax and $823 in insurance, combining to $419 per month in tax-and-insurance carrying costs alone. That figure represents 28% of gross rent, meaning before debt service, maintenance, or management, over a quarter of rental income disappears to taxes and insurance. At a normal rate flag, the tax burden is not an extraordinary problem relative to other markets, but in a low-rent county where the rent-to-price ratio is already thin, $419 per month in unavoidable fixed costs leaves almost no margin. Investors should model the full tax-and-insurance line explicitly rather than treating it as a residual.

The neighboring counties all outperform Jefferson on the rent-to-price ratio, which is the most direct indicator of cash-flow accessibility. Lane County at 0.0486, Josephine County at 0.0472, Yamhill County at 0.0462, Marion County at 0.0453, and Polk County at 0.0434 all generate more rent per dollar of purchase price than Jefferson's 0.0414. Marion County is particularly instructive: at a nearly identical median price of $437,106, it produces $1,652 in median rent versus Jefferson's $1,493, a $159 monthly difference that on a 20% down underwrite could represent a meaningful swing toward breakeven. Josephine County offers the lowest entry price among the neighbors at $384,522 and a 0.0472 ratio, making it a more accessible cash-flow target. Jefferson's overall score of 44 matches Lane and Yamhill but trails Marion and Polk at 45, and the difference is partly explained by Jefferson's weaker cash-flow score of 32 versus what those more rent-productive markets can offer. An investor should choose Jefferson over a neighbor only if they have a specific value-add thesis tied to a below-market acquisition, local knowledge of a specific submarket, or access to deal flow that the median statistics do not capture. Otherwise, the numbers consistently point toward Marion, Lane, or Josephine as better-aligned alternatives depending on whether the priority is price point, rent yield, or scale.