Greene County

Greene County sits at a gross rent-to-price ratio of 6.17%, which translates to a 4.01% cap rate on a median-priced asset at $247,189. Those two numbers tell the core story: this market generates some yield, but not enough to cover the carry at current financing rates. Run a 20% down payment at 6.85%, and the model spits out a monthly mortgage of $1,296 against estimated gross rent of $1,271 and expenses of $445, producing negative $470 in monthly cash flow and a cash-on-cash return of -9.92%. That is not a rounding error. The cap rate clearing at 4.01% sits below the cost of debt, meaning leverage works against you here at prevailing rates. Price appreciation is modest, 2.21% year-over-year, and the affordability index of 77 signals the market is meaningfully more affordable than the national baseline, which puts a ceiling on dramatic near-term price acceleration. On the cash-flow versus appreciation spectrum, Greene County leans slightly toward appreciation, but it is not a strong play on either axis at current purchase prices and financing costs.

The cash-flow buyer running standard leverage should look elsewhere. The negative cash-on-cash at -9.92% is too wide a gap to paper over with optimistic rent growth assumptions or minor expense reductions. The appreciation buyer gets a 72 appreciation score and a market priced at $247,189, but 2.21% annual price growth does not justify absorbing $470 per month in negative carry unless the hold thesis is long-term and the investor has conviction that East Tennessee population and wage trends will accelerate pricing. Where Greene County makes more sense is for the value-add operator or the all-cash buyer. Strip out the mortgage payment, and the cap rate of 4.01% becomes the actual yield on cost, which, while not exceptional, is serviceable for a low-leverage or unleveraged strategy. An investor who can buy below median, force appreciation through renovation, and either refinance into a more favorable rate environment or sell to an owner-occupant has a cleaner path to returns than someone acquiring at the median and financing at 6.85%.

Tennessee carries no state income tax, which matters for net yield calculations, but the taxInsurance data here shows a combined monthly tax and insurance burden of $220, already baked into the $445 estimated expense figure. The state-average effective property tax rate of 0.71% is flagged as normal, and at that rate it is not a headline underwriting risk. The note is worth keeping, because actual Greene County and township rates may differ from the state average, so confirm the specific parcel's assessed value and millage rate before closing. The insurance component at 0.36% annually is relatively benign compared to coastal or tornado-corridor markets. Neither line item is the problem here; the problem is the cost of debt against a cap rate that does not support it.

Comparing Greene against its neighbors sharpens the picture. Shelby County, which includes Memphis, posts a rent-to-price ratio of 7.58% against a median home price of $215,746, higher yield and lower entry point, though its overall score of 61 reflects other risks, likely regulatory exposure and tenant-concentration issues typical of large urban markets. Anderson County shows a rent-to-price ratio of 6.36% at $301,799, slightly better yield per dollar than Greene but at a higher absolute price, and it scores 62 overall versus Greene's 64. Rhea County and Lincoln County both score 68, higher than Greene's 64, and Lincoln at $257,281 is only marginally more expensive. An investor prioritizing overall market quality should underwrite Rhea and Lincoln before Greene. Carroll County scores comparably at 63 with a median price of $180,314, making it the more accessible entry point if price matters more than location. Greene makes the most sense over its neighbors when the specific target is the Greeneville submarket, where a buyer has local knowledge, an off-market pipeline, or a renovation operation that can compress the effective purchase price below the median and close the cap rate gap that makes leveraged deals impractical at current rates.

The primary risk in Greene is the stability score of 50, the lowest of the five scored metrics. A 70,000-person county without a diversified employer base can see rent demand soften meaningfully if a single large employer contracts. The data does not include named economic anchors for Greene, so the specific concentration risk cannot be characterized precisely, but a county of this size warrants direct diligence on who is employing the rental population and what the turnover and vacancy profile of the local rental stock actually looks like before committing capital.